Imperialism and Pop Culture — Peter Suderman Interviews Me

imagesI recently had an article in the print edition of Reason on Justin Hart’s Empire of Idea, a book about America’s efforts to influence world opinion. Peter Suderman interview me for a profile to run beside the article…but of course, I was over verbose, so most of my responses got cut. Peter, though, has kindly gave me permission to run the whole thing here instead.

Peter Suderman: What makes America so susceptible to foreign policy blunders?

NB: I think America’s tendency to stumble into foreign policy quagmires probably has a lot to do with the fact that we’re just everywhere. We’ve got a finger in every pie (and/or a foot on every neck, if you want to be more confrontational about it.) I think there’s just a
very strong ideological commitment to leading the world/solving all the world’s problems, which is partially expressed through spending tons and tons and tons of money on weapons — and once you’ve got all those weapons, there’s a huge incentive to use them, which reinforces the ideology, and you buy more weapons, and on and on and on.

PS: Do you think there’s a disconnect between U.S. policy/government elites and less-well-connected citizens when it comes to foreign policy? Or are they basically in sync?

NB: There are obviously a lot of Americans, of all walks of life, who enjoy the image of the United States as a superpower, and who identify with the US projection of power. On the other hand, there’s also a substantial number of folks who want us to be doing less. Obama won the Democratic primary basically as the less-imperialism candidate. But then, of course, in office, he’s projected force as enthusiastically, if thank God less incompetently, than his predecessor. So…I’d say that elites are more unified in their support for imperial adventures. Those adventures draw at least occasional substantial opposition from the public, but that opposition seems difficult to translate into elite action (except in cases of transparent policy failure, like Iraq).

PS: You’ve written an awful lot about pop-culture. Does pop-culture contribute in important ways to how America sees itself in the world? Are there particularly relevant, insightful pop culture portrayals of America’s foreign policy outlook?

NB: I think pop culture both reflects and can contribute to how America sees itself, or what America does. I guess the most obvious recent example of that is 24, which became a touchstone for pro-torture arguments.

I think Alan Moore and Dave Gibbons’ comic Watchmen is an extremely insightful look at America’s foreign policy. It was written in the 80s, obviously, but it’s still really relevant, I think. It’s about the allure of power and of saving others, about the utilitarian calculus of sacrifice that goes along with it, and about the way that that utilitarian calculus ultimately founders on the fact that no power is ever enough power, and that, however many bombs you have, the future really isn’t under your control. Ozymadnias’ piles and piles of dead bodies are meant to be a sacrifice on the altar of the new future — but the book strongly suggests that they are, really, just piles and piles of dead bodies. The fact that it’s the liberal one-worlder who turns out to be the mass murderer while the right-wing fascist nutball is repulsed by the violence is a nice reminder that imperialism can be centrist as well as extremist .

PS: What do you think America could have done to avoid being linked with
European colonialism? Or was that linkage inevitable?

NB: America has long had an isolationist strain; it seems at least possible that that could have had more of an influence than it did. Counterfactuals are hard to figure, though.

Reason ran a photo of me with the article as well…but looking at it again, I don’t think I can bear to reprint it. It’s just hard to avoid looking willfully smug in author photos, I guess. So if you want to see my shame, you’ll just have to pick up that issue of Reason.

The Nigerians Invade London

screen-shot-2012-06-03-at-4-30-20-pmJohn Christopher’s novel, The Possessors, is (among other things) a metaphor of imperial reversal, in which Westerners have the tables turned on them and become colonial victims of space invaders. Christopher’s fantastic Tripods Trilogy also flips colonialism, this time more specifically focused on Christopher’s native England.

Christopher’s “The Long Winter” from 1962, though, seemed like it would be different. I’d heard that it was an apocalyptic tale of a new ice age. No invading aliens; no imperial metaphor.

Shows what I know. The Long Winter is indeed about a new ice age; due to some typically vague scientific gobbledygook, the sun’s rays start to weaken, temperatures plummet, and the British isles, not to mention a large portion of the rest of the world, becomes so cold as to be virtually uninhabitable. Fuel stocks are used up, food becomes scarce, and civilization quickly and efficiently collapses into savagery.

But all of that is really just a set-up for the heart of the novel — which is an elaborate, gleefully mean-spirited excuse to shuffle the English center and the colonized periphery. As Britain disintegrates, all those who can flee desperately to warmer climes — especially Africa. The influx of wealth in that continent creates a new, flush black upper-class. The white immigrants, meanwhile, have, in most cases, lost everything, and become a despised, racial underclass — living in filth and poverty, eking out menial jobs as maids or laborers or prostitutes.

Christopher’s detailing of this reversal is both remorseless and brilliant. In one sequence, the protagonist Andy and his lover, Maddy, having just discovered that their currency is worthless, spend a night on a Nigerian beach rather than pay for lodging they can’t afford — only to be almost arrested under a newly passed white vagrancy law. In another passage, Christopher describes several white boarding school boys talking among themselves with a “fencing unsureness…[a] glib pretense of acceptance into a society which, they knew at heart, would always deny them.” Andy, overhearing them, connects their attitude instantly to that of some Jews he had himself known at boarding school in England.

What’s best about the book, however, is that Christopher is smart enough about the workings of empire to know that it can’t simply be inverted. Oftentimes, narratives which flip power relations simply assume that those on the bottom will behave like those on the top if given the chance. The “moral” ends up being that everyone would misuse power if given the chance — which may be true, but is certainly banal.

Christopher, though, knows that empire can’t be separated from history. Africa in his world is on top…but it wasn’t always so, and that fact matters a lot. Whites may be discriminated against just as blacks used to be, but the exact inflections of that discrimination are slightly different. Sometimes, this difference makes the whites’ situation even worse. Many of the Nigerians that Andy meets clearly relish the Europeans’ come-uppance — they remember suffering under the English boot, and they are eager for payback.

In other ways, though, the legacy of colonialism is a boon for the fallen Europeans — or at least gives them more options in some situations. Andy’s ex-wife, for example, is able to attach herself as a mistress to a wealthy Nigerian in part, Christopher implies, because European beauty standards remain in force. Similarly, many white men who served in European colonial armies are wanted as trainers by the Nigerian military, which is perpetually preparing for war against the white regime in South Africa.

Perhaps Christopher’s smartest reversal, though, is saved for the end of the book, when a Nigerian expedition travels north to colonize England. Andy goes along on the expedition, which is (after some power struggles) led by his Nigerian friend and benefactor, Abonitu. Abonitu repeatedly says that Andy serves as a kind of totem; a sort of living good luck charm. In some ways, this mirrors the manner in which European narratives often rely on a magic Negro — a black marker of authenticity, who provides the hero with spiritual, earthy wisdom. Andy, however, serves a slightly different purpose; he is not a marker of authenticity, but rather an icon of empire. He represents the shining white city of civilization, the position Abonitu, and Nigeria, is trying to occupy. Abonitu dehumanizes Andy, but the dehumanization functions differently than the way that, say, Tonto is dehumanized. Power is inflected by history; for the Nigerians the magic of conquest is not a seductive, humid heart of darkness, but a seductive, cold heart of white. Thus Abonitu describes his desire to take over London:

“I am excited by the idea,” Abonitu said. “And disgusted with myself, a little. When the princesses and queens of ancient Egypt died, they used to keep the bodies until putrefaction set in before handing them over to the embalmers. That was because they found that otherwise the embalmers used them for their lust. London is a dead queen.”

But London isn’t quite as defenseless as a dead queen. Again, history matters; the English — who, after all, still have modern technology, including guns — are able to fend off the Nigerian invasion. On the one hand, I enjoyed the way that Christopher made Abonitu so much more appealing than the English, so that you (or at least I) end up essentially rooting for the colonizer. But still, it is hard to avoid noticing that, in his imperial set pieces, Christopher pretty much always finishes up with a happy ending in which the plucky English throw off their oppressors. However clever his reversals, and however clearly he sees their hypocrisy and their faults, Christopher’s English background is determinative — his people still, somehow, always have to be the good guy. Even if you know how history works, I guess, it’s extremely hard to keep it from working on you.

Skeptics and Believers United

On Slate’s Double XX blog, Rebecca Watson yesterday put up a deeply depressing post about the sexism she’s faced in the skepticism/atheism community. At a skepticism conference some guy had asked her in an elevator to come back to his room for “coffee”. She later mentioned offhand in a public address that skeevy sexual pick-up lines are not necessarily best-practice for men who want to not be assholes. She was then, inevitably, deluged with hate mail from men telling her she was a bitch and that they didn’t need to be lectured about sexism by no bitch, duh, ’cause we’re smart and skeptical, yeah? (And if you think I’m being unfair to her interlocutors, just read the comments on her post.)

Anyway, Richard Dawkins weighed in with a post on a blog about the controversy. As you’d expect, he was thoughtful, even-handed, and eminently rational.

Dear Muslima

Stop whining, will you. Yes, yes, I know you had your genitals mutilated with a razor blade, and … yawn … don’t tell me yet again, I know you aren’t allowed to drive a car, and you can’t leave the house without a male relative, and your husband is allowed to beat you, and you’ll be stoned to death if you commit adultery. But stop whining, will you. Think of the suffering your poor American sisters have to put up with.

Only this week I heard of one, she calls herself Skep”chick”, and do you know what happened to her? A man in a hotel elevator invited her back to his room for coffee. I am not exaggerating. He really did. He invited her back to his room for coffee. Of course she said no, and of course he didn’t lay a finger on her, but even so …

And you, Muslima, think you have misogyny to complain about! For goodness sake grow up, or at least grow a thicker skin.

Richard

So Richard Dawkins is a giant flaming asshole. No one is especially surprised, I’d guess.

But what’s interesting I think is the way his assholish-ness is framed. Specifically, his misogyny — his sneering at women for acting as if harassment matters — is framed through and by his explicit antipathy towards the Muslim world. Violence against women abroad doesn’t raise his consciousness about violence against women at home. Rather, misogyny abroad (the fault of some other culture) becomes an excuse to dismiss misogyny at home (which may be less virulent, but is certainly something that is more his responsibility.)

Dawkins’ knee-jerk rhetorical recourse to the evil of Muslims to wipe clean his own sins reminded me again of the main reason that the new atheists creep me out. That reason being that the new atheism is an imperialist ideology. It’s marinated in US-Islam tension, weaponized by 9/11, and generally used as a justification for variously sneering at, bombing, and conquering peoples who it is convenient for us to view as irrational barbarians.

Dawkins’ comment also shows, with unusual clarity, why imperial adventures abroad are horrible for civil liberties at home. In an imperial power, the evil of your enemies is always infinitely more important than the evil at home. The injustice committed by those benighted religious backwards subhumans always trumps any possible injustice committed by you or me. Moral outrage is kept safely for the other, the opposition to whom guarantees one’s own immaculate virtue. Anyone who disagrees is a pampered whiner, who doesn’t realize how good (s)he has it. After all, are our rational bombs not the scourge of evil bearded menfolk everywhere? (And perhaps of the occasional woman in hijab as well, who is probably better off dead anyway?)

Of course, it’s not just atheists who are imperialists or anything. The Christian right, not to mention the Jewish right, have thrown their all behind our ongoing crusade of blood and self-righteousness. Dawkins likes to think those believing blowhards are his enemies – but his oleaginous condescension and brazen hypocrisy tells a different story. A bully who hits you on the orders of the hairy thunderer isn’t much different, after all, from a bully who hits you at the dictates of his own immaculate reason.
 

Made For You and Me: Localizing Disney’s Imperialism for an Egyptian Audience

 

I would be hard pressed to pick a better mascot for the United States as an imperial hegemon than Mickey Mouse. In Egypt — as with most of the “developing world” — Mr. Mouse is ubiquitous: you can see his big round eyes staring at you on the side of taxi cabs, through the glass windows of clothing stores, and from the cover of popular comic books. In fact, it is in this latter form that many Egyptians have come to know and love Mickey Mouse, or rather have come to know and love “Mîkî.”

Continue reading

Tintin and the Racist Dream

Bert Stabler was talking over in another thread about imperialism, art, and taste and how the three interact. In that vein, I thought I’d reprint one of my favorite sequences from Tintin.

This is an avenging Inca Mummy, summoned by the conflation of ancient magic and the sacrilege of European explorers.

The moments I most like in Tintin are almost invariably the creepy, surreal ones. I find Herge’s humor repetitive and precious in general — and for me the clear line style only emphasizes the clean, scrubbed, antiseptic cuteness of the slapstick. The weird dream moments, on the other hand, are all the weirder for their pristine perfection. The clarity itself becomes frightening. In the second panel above from “The Seven Crystal Balls,” the Inca mummy’s face at the window, almost unnoticeable but still preternaturally distinct, seems more real than real, it’s perfect finish giving it an undeniability. Even though this is (sort of) only a dream, as it turns out, the dream looks as solid as the mundane window the mummy climbs thorugh. The fact that different content is presented so rigorously through the same form becomes in itself uncanny.

But what is the difference in form? Well, it’s pretty clearly racial difference. A lot of pulp narratives, from Sherlock Holmes to Fu Manchu, draw much of their spark from colonial fever dreams, and that’s certainly the case for Tintin as well. In “Seven Crystal Balls,” the Inca curse, and the mummy itself, are the parts of the story I remembered best from my childhood, and still find most compelling. They’re creepy and cool and unsettling, with an emotional depth that isn’t there, for me at least, in, say, the drawing room comedy of the Castafiore Emerald.

This, then, is really a case where I don’t like the sequence despite its racism and imperialism. As far as I can tell, I like it because of them. The fascination/repulsion Herge feels towards the strange gods of colonized cultures generates real creative frisson. Which makes me wonder if maybe that’s true of racism and stereotypes in general. It seems like, beyond their other uses, they sometimes have an appeal which might be called aesthetic. A certain amount of cultural creativity goes into shaping the person in front of you into a phantom monstrosity, and that creativity can itself be exciting and fascinating. The dream’s appeal is its vividly imagined ugliness; the exhilaration of imposing on the world the gothic products of one’s skull.

Empire of Bland

Howard Zinn, Mike Konopacki, Paul Buhle
A People’s History of American Empire: A Graphic Adaptation
Metropolitan Books

I decided to review A People’s History of American Empire to answer one burning question: could Zinn possibly be as boring a writer as I remembered?

With some assurance, I can now say that the answer to this question is, decidedly, yes. Mike Konopacki and Paul Buhle have created a graphic adaptation of Zinn’s People’s History of the United States by shortening the text to cover only the last 150 years or so, and then rendering the whole into the easy-reader medium of comics, Nonetheless, the book is an interminable experience : a brutal slog through waist-high drifts of names, dates, and facts, all leading to the same arid exhortations. This volume is, in fact, a perfect mirror image of those deadly texts you were forced to read in school. Like them, A People’s History treats history not as a discipline or a study, or even as a story, but rather as a didactic, infallible bludgeon. The only difference is that where, say, Thomas Bailey tells you over and over that America was great, Zinn tells you over and over that it isn’t. American Empire even pulls out some of the same gimmicks with which textbooks attempt to disguise their irredeemable blandness — little factoids placed off to the side with a cutesy “Zinnformation” light-bulb logo attached, pseudo-first-person-accounts by random historical figures (Mark Twain, C.I.A. Iraq agent Donald Wilber) etc. etc. Even the cartoon format itself comes across as the grape flavoring on the kaopectate. What precisely, do indifferently drawn images of Zinn in front of a lecture hall add to either our historical knowledge or our enjoyment? Admittedly, American Empire is a good bit shorter than the honking, back-breaking tomes we dole out to high-school kids. Nonetheless, it fulfills the main requirement of the genre — try as I might, and despite being paid to do so, I discovered that, like any good textbook, this one was completely unfinishable.

The problem is not that I disagree with Zinn’s politics. On the contrary, I’m a pretty entrenched member of the blame-America-first crowd. I think, like Zinn, that imperialism is a blight and that, for many decades now, the United States has been its most enthusiastic and poisonous promulgator. But even for those who hate their country, unrelenting tales of U.S. perfidy and viciousness quickly become wearisome. Once you’ve seen one C.I.A.-backed slaughter of innocent civilians, you’ve kind of seen them all. It’s a horrible thing to say, but the atrocities in Zinn’s books, as in those of that other progressive superstar Noam Chomsky, quickly become, not so much numbing, as simply dull. When we’re jetting from Wounded Knee to Vietnam to Selma to Mexico to Iraq to Nicaragua and on and on, it’s hard to keep the names of the victims straight, much less care about their plight.

Crafting snoozeworthy material out of burning monks and butchered children is no easy task. Zinn does it the way textbook writers usually do — by being a lousy writer and a worse historian. The thing is, history isn’t a list of facts and dates. It’s a method for studying the past that relies on careful use of sources, weighing of evidence, and arguments. This last is especially important — there is always more than one way of looking at any particular event, and the push and pull of competing interpretations is what gives the past it’s interest and depth. Zinn has an all-purpose explanation for everything bad that’s ever happened —corporations did it. I don’t deny that there’s truth there, but it’s not the only truth, and reiterating it with such pat conviction goes a long way towards making it false. The boredom this book engenders is a defensive reaction; when one is being lied to so assiduously, one tends to instinctively recoil.

Here’s one example. In Zinn’s discussion of Hiroshima, he insists that the U.S. dropped the bomb as “a warning to the Soviet Union to stay out of Japan.” Hiroshima was, in other words, an imperial act — the first move in the American Cold War push for global domination. This is a fairly typical leftist theory, but I’ve never really bought it. Looking back from the post-Cold War world, it’s easy to believe that Russia was the focus of U.S. policy. At the time, however, Truman was probably thinking a whole lot more about Japan — the nation against which we were, after all, at war. That war had been incredibly costly; victory had by no means been assured, and there was every reason to believe that a land battle for the Japanese home islands would be horrific. Virtually every combatant nation in the war — including, most certainly, the Japanese — had already shown itself willing to kill civilians with impunity. The atomic bomb wasn’t really all that much of an escalation from, say, the firebombing of Dresden. Based on my own reading, Truman seems to have used the atom bomb because it was there, because we were at war, and because, when you’re at war, you use the weapons you’ve got. This tells you something about the logical outcome of warfare and about the consequences of power. But it tells you little about imperialism or capitalism per se. It’s a parable about Moloch, not Mammon.

Zinn’s account is flat not because he doesn’t agree with me, but because he doesn’t confront any opposition at all. Other than sneering at Truman’s palpably absurd contention that he tried to avoid killing civilians, Zinn never engages with the many, many scholars who have argued over the years about the rights and wrongs of the Hiroshima decision. Without these other voices, it’s difficult to see what’s at stake. The result is blinkered history, which wanders around bumping into trees while nattering on about the forest. In discussing the Cuban revolution, the decidedly un-militaristic Zinn is thus able to denigrate the idea of civilian control of the armed forces without appearing to even realize what he’s doing. In discussing U.S. China policy, he blithely identifies Mao as “a wartime ally against fascism” without ever raising the thorny question of whether it would really have been a great idea for the U.S. to back the man who became one of the most successful mass murderers in history. Part of the trouble here is that Zinn is trying to cover so much material so quickly that he can’t really stop to think about anything. But this is just another way of saying that his whole textbook-project is intellectually, and, as a consequence, morally, bankrupt. History without thought is an abomination. It should be driven from the earth, the classrooms where it is perpetrated should be razed to dust, and the ground where they stood salted.

The central evil of Zinn’s book stems, it seems to me, precisely from his inability to listen to what the other side has to say. Zinn tells us over and over that imperialism is driven by capital’s search for new markets, and by it’s desire to deflect unrest at home. But his commitment to this canard, and his general breakneck pace, prevents him from taking seriously what imperialists themselves actually contend they are about. From Rudyard Kipling to Christopher Hitchens, the rationale for empire has remained remarkably similar. We’re over there, not to exploit the little brown people, but to help them, for they are degraded and suffering. The argument for imperialism is, in other words, a progressive argument, built on exactly the kind of empathy for innocent pain, and on the same sort of outrage against oppression, in which Zinn himself traffics. This is why, when the father of investigative journalism, Bartoleme de las Casas protested Spanish atrocities in the new world, he helped his career a great deal, and the Indians precious little. The conscience of imperialism is still part of imperialism, and the ostentatious wringing of the left hand is a fine way to distract attention from the atrocities committed with the right. The opposite of empire, rhetorically, is not one-world socialism, but the brand of isolationism in vogue among über-nationalist nutcases like the John Birch Society. It’s not an accident that the most effective anti-imperialist ideology currently going is militant Islam.

The point here is adamantly not that Zinn is a hypocrite. On the contrary, American Empire includes several snippets from its author’s biography, and he seems like an interesting, dedicated, and even noble fellow — one of the few tenured radicals who has actually put his life and career on the line for the cause. He lost his job at Spelman because of his involvement in the anti-segregation movement; he risked indictment by helping Daniel Ellsberg hide the Pentagon Papers. But being a great activist isn’t the same as being a great thinker, and while Zinn may be the first, he is not the second. His exhortation at the end is fairly standard non-denominational humanist jeremiad — “to live now as we think human beings should live, in defiance of the worst of everything around us, is a marvelous victory.” Maybe. But George W. Bush probably thought something much like that when he bravely defied the opinion of the world and toppled that horrible dictator, Saddam Hussein. Good intentions aren’t going to overthrow imperialism; good intentions are what imperialism thrives on. If you want to end empire, you tend to need nationalism and religion and — unless you’re lucky enough to find a Gandhi — really remarkable quantities of blood. Zinn has no interest in struggling with the unpleasant ramifications of this. As a result, for all its facts and all its good-heartedness, A People’s History is about neither the United States, nor about Empire, but about, precisely, nothing.